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Abstract 
In a famous passage of his 1919 essay The Uncanny, in an attempt to 
elucidate the meaning of the German word “Das Unheimliche”, Sigmund 
Freud concluded that any effort would have be in the end vain for the simple 
reason that «we ourselves speak a language that is foreign». With this 
paradoxical statement, Freud disclosed the radical alterity which exists 
between human beings and language. Even if usually we think about 
linguistic expressions as the cultural device which represents par excellence the 
real condition of human life, language could prove to be something elusive 
and mysterious. Our legal tradition has always grounded its cultural and 
political existence upon language: since the times of the German historical 
school, language, law and society were considered strictly intertwined. 
Anyway, with the coming of postmodernism and globalization, as well as of 
complex political frameworks, this simplistic narrative has been progressively 
thrown into crisis. Following authors like Saussure, Benveniste, Foucault and 
Appadurai, as well as the precious insights provided by the Legal Realist 
movement, this paper aims to investigate the conflicting connection which 
nowadays takes place in legal and economic discourses. If it is true that 
traditionally law and language appear so strictly intertwined, every 
deconstruction of legal words casts its dark shadows upon our material and 
concrete existence: the erosion of legal language necessarily leads to a certain 
loss of fundamental rights, that is, of justice. In the age of “surmodernity” – 
as the French anthropologist Marc Augè called it – language becomes then 
a testing ground for verifying the evolution of contemporary sovereignty. 
 
Keywords: Language, Law, Sovereignty, Legal Realism, Cultural Studies. 
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1. Introduction: The Problem of Language 
 
Despite its traditional and prolonged oblivion, contemporary comparative 
law is becoming increasingly aware about the relevance of language for the 
correct knowledge of legal traditions.3 Language, so we read, is an essential 
tool for investigating the culture, the values, and the modes of thought 
embedded in each legal mentalité.4 Language, we may add, is in itself a cultural 
experience, the mirror of the history, philosophy, and traditions which 
characterize each people.5 In addition to this, and more generally, language 
exemplifies the historical evidence that law is essentially a system of 
communication, that is, a medium based on words, codes and symbols which 
conveys institutional settings, forms of powers, political practices and so on.6 
For many aspects, language is then the solution and at the same time the 
problem.7 This circumstance becomes particularly evident in the technicalities 
involved in translation issues and foreign law, as well as in the hermeneutic 
challenge involved in the majority of legal interpretations.8 In a famous 
 
3 For a complete survey about the themes and the problems raised by the study of language in 
comparative law, see V. Grosswald Curran, ‘Comparative Law and Language’, in M. Reimann, 
R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2019) 681–709. 
4 K. Kredens, S. Gozdz-Roszkowski (eds.), Language and the Law: International Outlooks (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2007). 
5 V.K. Bhatia, C.N. Candlin, and P. Evangelisti Allori (eds.), Language, Culture and the Law. The 
Formulation of Legal Concepts across Systems and Cultures (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008). 
6 See P. Goodrich, ‘Law and Language: An Historical and Critical Introduction’ (1984) 11 Journal 
of Law and Society 173–206. 
7 E. Haugen, ‘The Problems of Language’ (1973) 102: 3 Daedalus 1–4. 
8 For the translation issues, see F. Olsen, R. Lorz, D. Stein (eds.), Translation Issues in Language and 
Law (New York: Palgrave, 2009) and, more recently, S. Paolucci, ‘Foreignising and domesticating 
strategies in translating legal texts’ (2017) 2 International Journal of Legal Discourse 243–263; about 
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quote, Oliver Wendell Holmes expresses precisely this special relation which 
connects the use of words with the cultural environment of every legal 
tradition: “A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin 
of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to 
the circumstances and time in which it is used”.9 Words – we may add – are 
the signs of the changes taking place both in national and global context. As 
it has been shown, in the problems raised by the emerging “legal 
globalization” language plays a pivotal – even if still underestimated – role.10 
As we will see, legal concepts are the crystallization of legal rules and legal 
customs.11 The same division currently employed by comparative scholars 
between a civil law and a common law family relies upon a different use of 
terms and concepts in order to explain their history. 
Anyway, the aim of this article will not be to scrutinize traditional 
problems as related to the linguistic phenomenon, but on the contrary to 
investigate the unexpected relations which connect law and language in five 
different fields: political studies (§2); history of law (§3); comparative law 
methods (§4); ancient Roman law studies (§5); and finally institutional 
economics (§6). In each of these subjects, language will show as an essential 
cultural artifact allowing to throw lights on the hidden links buried in the 
deepest roots of our Western legal tradition. 
As it has been rightly said, we need to rethink the law and language relation, 
that is, to reflect on the nature of its genesis, on its paradoxes, on its political 
 
the hermeneutical challenges see R. Poscher, ‘The Hermeneutics of Law: An Analytical Model 
for a Complex General Account’, in M. Forster, K. Gjesdal (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Hermeneutics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) 326–353. 
9 O.W. Holmes writing for the majority in the case of Towne v Eisner [1918] 245 U.S. 418. 
10 J. Husa, Advanced Introduction to Law and Globalisation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019) 147 ff. 
11 H.E.S. Mattila, Comparative Legal Linguistics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013) 137. 
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premises and consequences.12 The only way for doing this is to take a 
different perspective, less close to the formalism and more sympathetic with 
the interdisciplinary attitudes of the Law & Humanities approaches.13 Afterall, 
taking inspiration from what the philosopher Martin Heidegger once said, as 
well as of being language is also (and mostly) the house of law.14 
 
2. Alienation and the Essence of Politics 
 
In a short passage of his 1919 essay The ‘Uncanny’, Sigmund Freud started 
his analysis with a curious statement. Attempting to elucidate the meaning of 
the German word “Das Unheimliche”, Freud claimed that any linguistic effort 
to grasp the essence of this word would be in the end vain for the simple 
reason that «we ourselves speak a language that is foreign».15 Unheimliche – 
literally, “unhomely” – indicates in German the opposite of what is familiar: 
the “uncanny” is then something which is not known, something mysterious, 
and for this reason frightening. Anyway, what Freud really wants to 
demonstrate is something different and at the same time more problematic, 
that is, the radical alterity between human beings and language or, in other 
words, the feelings of alienation and discomfort implied when we dive into 
 
12 J.M. Broekman, Rethinking Law and Language: The Flagship ‘Speech’ (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2019). 
13 For an original perspective in this way, see C. Hutton, Language, Meaning and the Law (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 
14 M. Heidegger, ‘Letter on “Humanism” (1946)’, in Id., Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) 239: “Language is the house of being. In its home human beings dwell. 
Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home”. 
15 S. Freud, The ‘Uncanny’, in J. Strachey (ed.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVII (1917–1919): An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, (London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1955) 221. 
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the deep waters of our native tongue.16 The term “uncanny”, in this sense, is 
just a small sign of a larger phenomenon related to the inner mysteriousness 
of language. 
One way to understand Freud’s position is to think that, from the very first 
moment of our birth, as members of a speaking community we inherit a 
complex universe of words and meanings of which we are not the architects. 
Language precedes us for the simple reason that words, sounds and symbols 
belong to the tradition of our ancestors, so that every time we learn a 
language (even our own) we are thrown inside a realm that is foreign, 
extraneous and alien. 
A clear indication of that is provided by the etymology of the word infancy, 
the earliest period of childhood. The “infant” is, literally, the subject who 
cannot speak (from Latin in-, “not”, and -fari, “to speak”). Infancy is the 
uncertain and ambiguous period of our life in which we are conscious but 
without the mastery of language. The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben 
once wrote that it is precisely this curious situation which marks the biggest 
difference between man and animals: «[a]nimals – Agamben writes – do not 
enter language, they are already inside it. Man, instead, by having an 
infancy, by preceding speech, splits this single language and, in order to 
speak, has to constitute himself as the subject of language – he has to say I».17 
Usually, we consider human language in a completely opposite way, and 
specifically as the most natural function of human life. Language has a 
natural basis on human’s anatomy, and a practical use in the construction of 
social and political relations. It could be considered as an autonomous 
 
16 D. Punter, ‘Shape and Shadow: On Poetry and the Uncanny’, in D. Punter (ed.) A New 
Companion to The Gothic (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) 262. 
17 G. Agamben, Infancy and History. The Deconstruction of Experience (London: Verso, 1993) 52. 
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aesthetics object, as poetic art shows, or as a rational instrument, as in the 
case of logic. Moreover, language is the place of persuasion and of emotions. 
This vision, inherited since the times of Aristotle, points toward the unique 
bond that connects human intelligence and speech (lógos, λόγος), a 
circumstance that is rooted in the same exceptionality of man.18 As we have 
seen, it is certainly true that animals emit sounds in order to signal risks or 
share information, but for Aristotle man is the solely master of articulated 
words: as we may read in Politics (1253a) «language is the peculiarity of man, 
in comparison with other animals».19 Jean-Pierre Vernant made a very 
similar point in his analysis of the ancient Greek polis: 
 
The system of the polis implied, first of all, the extraordinary 
preeminence of speech over all other instruments of power. Speech 
became the political tool par excellence, the key to all authority in 
the state, the means of commanding and dominating others. This 
power of speech—which the Greeks made into a divinity, Peitho, 
the force of persuasion—brings to mind the efficacy of words and 
formulas in certain religious rituals, or the value attributed to the 
“pronouncements” of the king when he rendered final themis 
(judgment). Actually, however, we are dealing with quite a 
different matter. Speech was no longer the ritual word, the precise 
formula, but open debate, discussion, argument.20 
 
 
18 R. McKeon, ‘Aristotle’s Conception of Language and the Arts of Language’ (1946) 41 Classical 
Philology 193–206. 
19 Aristotle, Politics (E Barker trans, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 11. 
20 J.-P. Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982) 49–50. 
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This passage quoted by Vernant becomes in our case crucial since he 
clearly connects the use of articulated language to the origins of a political 
community. Language is what gives sense and form to our social and juridical 
existence, allowing to declare what is “advantageous” and what is “harmful”, 
what is “just” and what is “unjust”. As a consequence, a crisis of language 
affects directly the political framework, the rule of law, and the same 
possibility of living inside a community.21 
We find an unexpected derivation of Aristotelian’s teachings in one of the 
most notorious thinkers of European humanism: Brunetto Latini (1220-
1295). In the third book of his didactic and allegoric treatise – The Book of the 
Treasure – following the teachings of Aristotle and of Cicero’s treatise De 
invention, Latini argues that language is the essential prerequisite for the 
existence of the city.22 Language lies at the basis of justice, human friendship 
and peaceful community life, that is, of the only values upon which a 
commonwealth can be fruitful built.23 Latini stresses in particular one point 
which in our case proves to be central. At the beginning of every political 
community, he imagines a group of enlightened man who persuaded the 
 
21 The strict correlation between language, society and the disintegration of a political community 
has been vividly emphasized also by B. de Jouvenel, Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 304: «The elementary political process is the action 
of mind upon mind through speech. Communication by speech completely depends upon the 
existence in the memories of both parties of a common stock of words to which they attach much 
the same meanings […]. Even as people belong to the same culture by the use of the same 
language, so they belong to the same society by the understanding of the same moral language. 
As this common moral language extends, so does society; as it breaks up, so does society». 
22 B. Latini, The Book of the Treasure - Li Livres dou Treasure (New York: Garland, 1993). On Latini’s 
thought, see M. Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992) 28 ff. 
23 B. Latini, The Book of the Treasure, cit., 279. 
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others about the preferability of a life spent with dignity of reason and 
wisdom instead of a barbaric one. Rhetoric was the mean by which they 
brought the rest of the population out of the savage and for this fact, Latini 
goes on, these wise men were regarded as similar to the gods.24 At the opposite, 
for Latini litigations, conflicts and civil disorders raise from a failure of 
language: the ruler of the city, in order to prevent civil wars and riots 
convincing his citizens to restrain their passions, has to be a trained orator 
and a skilled peacemaker. The capacity of speaking, the ability of persuasion 
and the art of rhetoric, we may conclude, are not only the basic components 
of the state but also the skills which lead to political power and leadership.  
 
3. Von Savigny, the Volksgeist and the Spirit of the Law 
 
In the history of western legal tradition, the clearest example about the 
essential role of language in the formation and development of political and 
juridical entities can be found in the famous short book published by 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779–1861), Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation 
and Jurisprudence (1814).25 As it is known, Savigny’s purpose was to hinder any 
kind of codification of private law, since all existing codes – the Napoleonic 
one, but also the Austrian and the Prussian – were totally inappropriate for 
the unique cultural and political situation of German people. Law, in 
Savigny’s mind, should have been the product of the spirit of the people – 
the Volksgeist – and not the result of an artificial and unnatural import from 
other countries. In a famous passage, Savigny argued that: «[…] this organic 
connection of law with the being and character of the people, is also 
 
24 B. Latini, The Book of the Treasure, cit., 280. 
25 F.C. von Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence (London: Littlewood & 
co., 1831). 
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manifested in the progress of the times; and here, again, it may be compared 
with language. For law, as for language, there is no moment of absolute 
cessation; it is subject to the same movement and development as every other 
popular tendency; and this very development remains under the same law of 
inward necessity, as in its earliest stages».26 
In constructing his rhetorical argument against the Napoleonic code, 
Savigny claimed that both law and language share the same genetic 
substance: they are similar and proceed hand in hand, acting like latent forces 
embedded inside culture. As a consequence, they cannot be isolated, nor 
shaped by «the arbitrary will of a legislator».27 As Harold J. Berman wrote, 
Savigny «emphasized the intimate relationships between the law of a given 
people and its whole culture (its language, its customs, its common legal 
consciousness) viewed in historical perspective».28 Precisely for this reason, 
Roscoe Pound noted that in the Historical School «law is found, not made».29 
We know how much this paradigm must have influenced later scholars. In 
his famous Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973–1979), Friedrich August von 
Hayek (1899–1992) argued for example that both law and language, as well 
as morals, money and markets, are the result of a spontaneous growth, 
emerging undersigned from the reciprocal interaction of men: it constitutes 
a persistency of the constructivist fallacy to conceive linguistic structure as 
the product of an artificial reason.30 
 
26 Savigny, Of the Vocation, 27. 
27 Savigny, Of the Vocation, 30. 
28 H.J. Berman, Law and Language. Effective Symbols of Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013) 124. 
29 R. Pound, Interpretations of Legal History (New York: Macmillan Company, 1923) 16. 
30 F.A. von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (London: Routledge, 2013) 24. See also A.I. Ogus, 
‘Law and Spontaneous Order: Hayek’s Contribution to Legal Theory’, (1989) 16 Journal of Law 
and Society 393–409. 
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Anyway, it is hard to deny the particular construction of language 
performed by jurists. Language, after all, «is the tool of the lawyer».31 
Jurisprudence is a ‘word science’, and the formation of legal concepts 
proceeds hand in hand with a technical jargon. According to some scholars, 
this is particularly true also from an etymological point of view: the Latin 
term for “law” – lex – could be the linguistic root of lexicon, as meaning 
“word”, both deriving from the Greek verb λέγειν (légein) “to say”.32 
Language then re-presents law, that is, it makes law present, visible and alive. 
Moreover – as in the case of Savigny and Aristotle – language contributes to 
build the cultural and political framework around which a system of law can 
exist and be in force. Without a communality of language, that is, without a 
shared belief about the meaning of words, law is nothing more than an empty 
formulation released from any existential foundation. 
 
4. Linguistic Aspects in Comparative Law 
 
It would surely be an exaggeration to say that law is “solely” language. We 
know that throughout Western history, legal institutions have shown their 
existence also with non-linguistic acts (gestures, tacit customs, images, 
performances, and so on). Anyway, it is hard to deny how relevant have 
become the impact of words upon legal systems.33 Statues are coded in 
language; justice is administered by means of documents and written 
procedures; legal definitions contribute to the creation of rights and duties, 
regulating society and determining the inclusion (or the exclusion) of subjects 
from the legal system. As typically happens with declaration of rights, the 
 
31 B. Grossfeld, The Strength and Weakness of Comparative Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 85. 
32 B. Grossfeld, The Strength and Weakness, 94. 
33 J. Gibbons, ‘Language and the Law’, in (1999) 19 Annual Review of Applied Linguistics 156–173. 
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inscription of natural life inside the juridico-political order of the nation-state 
is necessarily performed through language, and mostly through a process of 
writing.34 
But in the globalized legal order which nowadays we inhabit, far from 
being the solution language is often the problem. The specific way in which 
legal concepts are expressed, for example, or the exact meaning which words 
possess, are a constant source of discomfort among lawyers.35 
An echo of this thinking is well present in some contemporary 
comparatists. Pierre Legrand, appealing to a radical impossibility of mutual 
understanding between cultures, grounded his strenuous opposition about 
the convergence of civil law and common law traditions precisely upon the 
exceptionality of language and juridical lexicon.36 For Legrand «[…] a 
significant part of the very real emotional and intellectual investment that 
presides over the formulation of the meaning of a rule lies beneath 
consciousness because the act of interpretation is embedded, in a way that 
the interpreter is often unable to appreciate empirically, in a language and 
in a tradition, in sum, in a whole cultural ambience».37 In every legal culture 
there are cognitive structures which epistemologically shape the legal 
mentalité, marking in a unique way the lexicon of lawyers, judges and legal 
 
34 For these suggestions, see G. Agamben, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998) 127. 
35 J. Engberg, ‘Word Meaning and the Problem of a Globalized Legal Order’, in P.M. Tiersma, 
L.M. Solan (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012) 175–186. 
36 P. Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’’ (1997) 4 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 
111–124. 
37 Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’, 115. 
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operators.38 The distance separating legal traditions – in this case civil law and 
common law – is then more the product of those nearly ‘untranslatable words’ 
than a direct consequence of legal technicalities. Following Jacques Derrida, 
for Legrand the supposed translation turns out to be rather a transposition, that 
is, a resignification.39 Language is conceived as a “collective consciousness”, not 
easily transportable among places or people; law, in turn, is the product of a 
genuine cultural experience, rooted in a certain time and space.40 There is 
no objectivity of knowledge about the world (and especially about the law) 
since everything, on Legrand’s view, is already «linguistically pre-
structured»41, so that «in order to translate a language, or a text, without 
changing its meaning, one would have to transport its audience as well».42 In 
the absence of any kind of meta-language, we are doomed to rest inside its 
prison, hostages of our own world-view and unable to escape.43 
 
38 P. Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’ (1996) 45 The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 60. 
39 P. Legrand, ‘Word/World (of Primordial Issues for Comparative Legal Studies)’, in A.L. Kjær, 
M. Rask Madsen, H. Krunke, H. Petersen (eds.), Paradoxes of European Legal Integration (London: 
Routledge, 2016) 193. See on this point J. Derrida, Positions (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1972) 31: 
«à la notion de traduction, il faudra substituer une notion de transformation: transformation réglée d’une langue 
par une autre, d’un texte par un autre». 
40 P. Legrand, ‘Comparative Legal Studies and the Matter of Authenticity’ (2006) 1 Journal of 
Comparative Law 388: «[l]egal experience is immersed in a cultural context: it is modulated. It is 
indeed the legal culture – a notion that makes specific reference to the sub-culture that is 
constituted amongst law specialists, especially as regards the repository of those elements that 
partake in the stable, general, and unconscious – that provides the ‘internal logic’ of the law » 
41 Legrand, ‘Word/World’, 195. 
42 E. Hoffman, Lost in Translation. Life in a New Language (London: Minerva, 1991) 275. 
43 Legrand, ‘Word/World’, 202. 
14                              CARDOZO ELECTRONIC LAW BULLETIN                                   [Vol. 25 
 
  
This idea, extreme as it may appear, has its origins in the principle of 
relativity in language.44 
A famous example of this approach can be found in the important studies 
about the condition of “primitive” cultures realized by the American 
anthropologist Benjamin Lee Whorf. For Lee Whorf, in order to properly 
understand how native populations think and act we must move from a 
simple psychological perspective to a more cultural one: language, in this 
view, becomes the high road for decoding cultures and mentalities.45 As 
Whorf writes, «[e]very language contains terms that have come to attain 
cosmic scope of reference, that crystallize in themselves the basic postulates 
of an unformulated philosophy, in which is couched the thought of a people, 
a culture, a civilization, even of an era».46 This is true not only for native 
communities, we could say, but also for our own tradition: words like 
“reality”, “substance”, “cause”, “space”, “time”, and so on, are signatures of 
a universe of thought, that is, inscriptions of an implicit philosophy buried in 
the deepest layers of history. In a famous article, the French linguist Émile 
Benveniste argued something very similar: for him, the philosophy of 
Aristotle is more the result of the structure of ancient Greek grammar, than 
 
44 The classical opposition between the theory of language as a universal mirror of reality (realism), 
and language as the expression of different world views (linguistic relativity thesis) is specifically 
analyzed in A.L. Kjær, ‘A Common Legal Language in Europe?’, in M. Van Hoecke (ed.), 
Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 380 ff. 
45 B. Lee Whorf, ‘A Linguistic Consideration of Thinking in Primitive Communities’, in J.B. 
Carrol (ed.), Language, Thought, and Reality. Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf (Cambridge MA: 
The MIT Press, 1956) 65. 
46 B. Lee Whorf, ‘An American Indian Model of the Universe’, in J.B. Carrol (ed.), Language, 
Thought, and Reality, 61. 
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the invention of a “new” thought.47 Precisely for this reason, Lee Whorf goes 
on, language is a «cohesive aggregate of cultural phenomena».48 The task of 
the ethnologist – but we could say: also of the jurist – is to «light up the thick 
darkness of the language, and thereby of much of the thought, the culture, 
and the outlook upon life of a given community».49 
 
5. Language and Roman Law: The Magic Realism of Words 
 
As it has been shown, the constitutive power of language is extremely 
relevant for understanding how legal concepts emerged from past to present 
times. Without too much risk, it is possible to argue that the evolution of 
Western law is essentially the development of the way in which legal terms 
are articulated. Concepts do not exist in nature per se; quite on the contrary, 
they emerged from the artificial invention of experts and wise jurists which 
bent the language to new uses giving birth to something never seen before. 
Law was then the slow product of tradition, forgotten uses and ancient 
customs. 
This idea had its counterpart in the rigid formalism which surrounded the 
practice of law since ancient times. Formalism is something that we can find 
both in Roman and German law where the incorrect pronunciation of 
specific formulas or names determined mechanically the loss of the legal 
 
47 E. Benveniste, ‘Categories of Thought and Language’, in E. Benveniste, Problems in General 
Linguistics (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971) 57: «[n]ow it seems to us—and we shall 
try to show—that these distinctions are primarily categories of language and that, in fact, Aristotle, 
reasoning in the absolute, is simply identifying certain fundamental categories of the language in 
which he thought». 
48 B. Lee Whorf, ‘A Linguistic Consideration’, 65. 
49 B. Lee Whorf, ‘A Linguistic Consideration’, 73. 
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provision. A classic example is the actio de arboribus succisis mentioned in the 
ancient XII Tables and accorded to a landowner for the screw cutting: the 
roman jurist Gaius curiously informs us that a claimant who sued another 
for cutting his vines, instead of pronouncing the correct formula arboribus 
(“trees”) wrongly pronounced in its place the word vitibus (“vines”) thereby 
losing the case (Gai, IV, 11).50 
Precisely in this sense there is a particular passage in Savigny’s study which 
deserves further attention. Focusing on the ancient laws’ sacred form, on the 
archaisms and on the solemn ceremonies which pervaded the practice of 
Roman institutions, Savigny argued that this “symbolic acts” – so puerile and 
irrational as they may seem to be – constitute on the contrary «the true 
grammar of law in this period».51 Formal acts like wedding ceremonies, 
oaths, trials by ordeals, or other judicial procedurals often retain an invisible 
symbolism which is the most striking proof of the complex cultural 
framework hidden behind juridical institutions. 
In very different circumstances of time and place than Savigny, the English 
anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski considered rites such as initiation, 
marriage, reconciliation, etc., as essential means in creating a social and 
political bond between the members of a community. In a relevant passage 
of his Coral Gardens and Their Magic (1935) – the last book of the trilogy 
dedicated to the ethnography of Trobriand Islanders – Malinowski 
emphatically wrote: 
 
50 See the original Latin text: «Unde eum, qui de vitibus succisis ita egisset, ut in actione vites 
nominaret, responsum est eum rem perdidisse, cum quia debuisset arbores nominare eo, quod lex 
XII tabularum, ex qua de vitibus succisis actio competeret, generaliter de arboribus succisis 
loqueretur» in Gaius, Institutiones, or Institutes of Roman law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935) 454–
455. 
51 Savigny, Of the Vocation, 26. 
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Whether the marriage vows are treated as a sacrament or as a 
mere legal contract – and in most societies they have this twofold 
character – the power of words in establishing a permanent human 
relation, the sacredness of words and their socially sanctioned 
inviolability, are absolutely necessary to the existence of social 
order. If legal phrases, if promises and contracts were not regarded 
as something more than flatus vocis, social order would cease to exist 
in a complex civilization as well as in a primitive tribe.52 
 
Speech acts like that involved in marriage rites are not simply the 
expression of a venerable tradition transmitted from generation to 
generation, but the real glue that unites a small group of people ensuring a 
peaceful existence. The spoken word is sacred because it performs a function 
which goes far beyond the simple completion of the ritual. Legal terms, 
contracts, trials, religious sacraments and so on make present the binding 
force of a formula, and at the same time the moral and political ideas which 
lie behind them. The liturgy of the spoken word is what allows a community 
to erect a wall against social disorder, chaos and in the end anomy. In 
primitive societies this function is particularly evident and remains intact in 
modern situations: the words of the law need to be accepted and trusted by 
all the members of a community to become effective and respected. In the 
age of documents and digital data, words still maintain the critical role of 
measuring the degree of acceptance and of trustworthiness among the public 
sphere. 
 
52 B. Malinowski, Coral Gardens and Their Magic: A Study of the Methods of Tilling the Soil and of Agricultural 
Rites, in Id., Trobriand Islands, vol. 2: The Language of Magic and Gardening (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1935) 234. 
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Anyway, the strict correlation between things, acts, and the “magical” 
power words as described so far has not gone unnoticed by legal scholars. 
The founding father of Scandinavian legal realism, Axel Ha ̈gerstrom̈, 
devoted important reflections about the mysterious roots of religious and 
legal institutes. One of his most relevant works – the first volume of the 
colossal Der römische Obligationsbegriff im Lichte der allgemeinen römischen 
Rechtsanschauung (1927) – bears a subtitle particularly illustrative in this 
direction: Die Obligation als mystische Gebundenheit einer Person durch eine andere 
(literally: “the obligation as a mystical bond on persons by means of another 
person).53 
The book is a meticulous study of the archaic forms of Roman private law, 
especially of contracts, settlements and agreements as philologically 
reconstructed in all their distinctive features. In particular, for Ha ̈gerstrom̈ 
the three most important forms of contracts – gesta per aes et libram, in iure cessio, 
and sponsio – clearly showed the influence of the ritual and magical character 
of Roman’s culture. In these three forms of negotium is indeed the loyal respect 
of solemn forms, the practice of certain gesture, and finally the pronunciation 
of specific words that produces legal effects. From the beginning, Roman law 
is then deeply rooted in a ritual and symbolic dimension without which it is 
simply incomprehensible: as it has been rightly said, “[i]n the realm of 
contracts, these covenants would only be papers with scrabbled words if they 
were deprived of the ritual and its significance”.54 But Ha ̈gerstrom̈ did not 
concentrate only on the scenic façade of rituality, postulating something 
rather more radical and at the same time foundational. The “magical words” 
 
53 A. Hägerström, Der römische Obligationsbegriff im Lichte der allgemeinen römischen Rechtsanschauung, Vol. 
I (Upsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1927). For a general survey about Scandinavian realism, see J. 
Bjarup, Skandinavische Realismus. Hägerström, Lundstedt, Olivecrona, Ross (Freiburg: Alber, 1978). 
54 P. Mindus, A Real Mind. The Life and Work of Axel Hägerström (New York: Springer, 2009) 208. 
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at the core of the ritual and symbolic practices of ancient Roman law were 
not simply the fulfillment of an archaic memory: they produced tangible 
social and political effects because they reached the psychological response 
of citizens, judges and officials which from the moment of birth were 
institutionally conditioned by such culture, education and religion.55 The 
entire experience of ancient law – its institutes, as well as its actors and 
practitioners – was then immersed in the magic fluid of sacredness, receiving 
substance and effects from the solemn forms of ritualization.56 
Some years later, the Swedish jurist Karl Olivecrona took inspiration from 
this debate remarking the theory developed by Ha ̈gerstrom̈.57 As in the 
ancient Roman experience, words are, for Olivecrona, tools for regulating 
the life of a community. In the magical view, language determines the 
creation of rights and duties, as well as their transference and extinction, but 
modern view is not very distant from this fact. In our contemporary 
experience, legal language is not simply “descriptive language”, but a 
“directive” one.58 Law implies a regularized and repetitive morphology 
which became more and more connected with the use of organized power: 
legal terms are then means for achieving goals, instruments for keeping the 
peace or – as Olivecrona bitterly notes – “for sending men to death on the 
battlefield in time of war”.59 
As is well known, the entire field gained its philosophical relevance with 
the well-known theory of performatives as developed by John Austin in his 
 
55 On this point, see also E. Pattaro, Il realismo giuridico scandinavo I – Axel Hägerström (Bologna: 
Cooperativa libraria universitaria editrice, 1974) 239 ff. 
56 A. Hägerström, Obligationsbegriff, cit., 36 ff. 
57 K. Olivecrona, Law as Fact (London: Stevens & Sons, 1971) 245 ff. 
58 Olivecrona, Law as Fact, cit., 253. 
59 Olivecrona, Law as Fact, cit., 254. 
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posthumous Philosophical Papers.60 In particular, for Austin performatives are 
a kind of utterance very similar to a statement, with the important difference 
that they don’t simply describe or analyze something but rather do 
something.61 In his book Speech Acts (1969), John Searle finally summed up 
the entire debate discussing what he called “institutional facts”: marriages, 
promises, judgments and so on are phenomena different from mere “brute 
facts” because they presume the existence of legal institution by virtue of 
which they can acquire social and juridical value.62 
 
6. Conclusion: Neoliberalism and the Collapse of Meaning 
 
Recently, an interesting and innovative theory has been advanced by the 
Indian American anthropologist Arjun Appadurai about the origins of the 
global and financial crisis of 2007. For Appadurai, the main cause behind 
the collapse of economic systems must be traced not solely in greed, selfish 
ambitions and weak regulation, but primarily in a «failure of language».63 As 
is well known, derivatives – the specific contracts employed in financial 
markets for risky investments in which two or more contractors agree on the 
future prices of financial assets – played the major role in the explosion of the 
subprime market. Overturning the established view according to which they 
are ordinary tools in investment management, for Appadurai derivatives 
 
60 See S. Castignone, “Il linguaggio del diritto. Karl Olivecrona”, in Id., Diritto, linguaggio, realtà 
(Turin: Giappichelli, 1995) 211. 
61 J.L. Austin, “Performative Utterances,” in Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) 
235; Id., How to do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 
62 J. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969). 
63 A. Appadurai, Banking on Words: The Failure of Language in the Age of Derivative Finance (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2016) 1 ff. 
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cannot be conceived as conventional financial contracts: behind their 
technical appearance, they hide indeed the subtler form of a promise, and in 
particular of a failed promise. In the chain of financial products which 
characterize the framework of the system, a derivative is more than a simple 
tool: it is a linguistic phenomenon, «a referent to something more tangible 
than itself», in particular a future profit or some other underlying asset.64 Its 
form is the same of the sign in linguistics which, in Saussarian theory, is the 
dyadic composition of a “signifier” and a “signified”. The derivative is the 
mirror of the same distinction: it is a linguistic artifact referring to a value 
implied as benchmark in order to limit losses or multiply gains. 
The logic of promissory finance is then inseparable from a distorted theory 
of language in which the abuse of these contracts, as well as of the indefinite 
dissemination of promises, alienated the ideal and the reality of economic 
exchange. Translating from financial jargon, in the critical view provided by 
Appadurai a derivative becomes a broken promise supported by the creation 
of profit as detached from any real condition – a profit often fruit of the desire 
of money as itself.65 If language is a social activity, then derivatives are 
precisely its denial, that is, the radical separation between words and social 
purposes, reality and economics. At the dawn of 2007, when the global 
market was entirely driven by these products, the system collapsed together 
with the complex and intricated chain of contracts which precariously 
sustained it. Stock market fell, big insurance companies were forced to hire 
thousands of employees, real estate market crashed but what was really lost 
 
64 Appadurai, Banking on Words, cit., 4. 
65 On this point, see N. Yuran, What Money Wants: An Economy of Desire (Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 2014). 
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was something central and at the same time more structural: the meaning of 
words, of trust relationships, and of language.66 
If Appadurai’s main interest is a general deconstruction of contemporary 
economic logic with the aim of showing the permanence of some 
archetypical anthropological categories in our behavior, it cannot be denied 
anyway that the real consequences of his analysis imply a general rethinking 
about the mutual bond of language, law and politics. The American scholar 
James Boyd White in a book emphatically entitled “When Words Lose Their 
Meaning”, stressed the strict correlation between words and political action: 
if our linguistic structures collapse – as in the case of the subprime market 
analyzed by Appadurai –, if a given community lose the linguistic framework 
at the base of its culture, what is lost is the true possibility of acting, 
preventing and correcting dysfunctions and abuses.67 
In conclusion, following and extending the reasoning of White, we can 
argue that differently from the standard approach developed in modern 
linguistic studies, words should not be regarded simply as the object of a 
theoretical contemplation, but as the necessary precondition for systemic 
change to operate. Obviously, this does not intend to be a sort of abstract 
logocentrism but on the contrary the simple acknowledgement that it is the 
way we use language which influences the creation and the existence of 
fundamental rights.68 
 
66 Appadurai, Banking on Words, cit., 14. 
67 J.B. White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and 
Community (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984) 7–8. 
68 White, When Words Lose Their Meaning, x. See also Id., Living Speech: Resisting the Empire of Force 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) 1–13. 
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«The limits of my language mean the limits of my world»69: this famous 
statement is certainly true also in jurisprudence. The greatest risk in our times 
is precisely that words lose their charge, becoming empty forms alienated 
from meaning: if this will occur – as too often happens to see – what will 
remain are just rules and not laws.70 
  
 
69 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, prop. 5.6 (London, Routledge, 2001) 68. 
70 See A. Harris, ‘Language and Alienation’, in B. Bain (ed.), The Sociogenesis of Language and Human 
Conduct (New York: Springer, 1983) 106: «Speech is often equivocal. […] Language is at the service of 
relations of production and reproduction which also distort and alienate» (emphasis of the author). 
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